Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/784
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dc.contributor.authorÖzkaya, Özhan-
dc.contributor.authorXavier, Karina B.-
dc.contributor.authorDionisio, Francisco-
dc.contributor.authorBalbontín, Roberto-
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-04T15:10:11Z-
dc.date.issued2017-08-
dc.identifier.citationMaintenance of microbial cooperation mediated by public goods in single and multiple traits scenarios Özhan Özkaya, Karina B. Xavier, Francisco Dionisio, and Roberto Balbontín J. Bacteriol. JB.00297-17; Accepted manuscript posted online 28 August 2017, doi:10.1128/JB.00297-17pt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/784-
dc.descriptionThe uploaded article is the accepted manuscript, posted online 28 August 2017, provided by Journal of Bacteriology. It has peer-review and it contains attached the supplementary materials within the pdf. This publication hasn't any creative commons license associated.pt_PT
dc.description.abstractMicrobes often form densely populated communities, which favor competitive and cooperative interactions. Cooperation among bacteria often occurs through the production of metabolically costly molecules produced by certain individuals that become available to other neighboring individuals, called public goods. This type of cooperation is susceptible to exploitation, since non-producers of a public good can benefit from it while saving the cost of its production (cheating), gaining a fitness advantage over producers (cooperators). Thus, in mixed cultures, cheaters can increase in frequency in the population, relative to cooperators. Sometimes, and as predicted by simple game-theoretic arguments, such increase in the frequency of cheaters causes loss of the cooperative traits by exhaustion of the public goods, eventually leading to a collapse of the entire population. In other cases, however, both cooperators and cheaters remain in coexistence. This raises the question of how cooperation is maintained in microbial populations. Several strategies to prevent cheating have been described involving a single trait and a unique environmental constraint. In this review, we describe current knowledge on the evolutionary stability of microbial cooperation, discussing recent discoveries describing the mechanisms operating in multiple traits and multiple constraints settings. We conclude with a consideration of the consequences of these complex interactions, and we briefly discuss the potential role of social interactions involving multiple traits and multiple environmental constraints in the evolution of specialization and division of labor in microbes.pt_PT
dc.description.sponsorshipHoward Hughes Medical Institute International Early Career Scientist grant: (HHMI 55007436); Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia postdoctoral fellowship: (SFRH/BDP/109517/2015); Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian doctoral fellowship: (01/BD/13).pt_PT
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherAmerican Society for Microbiologypt_PT
dc.relationHHMI 55007436pt_PT
dc.relationSFRH/BDP/109517/2015pt_PT
dc.relation01/BD/13pt_PT
dc.rightsembargoedAccesspt_PT
dc.subjectMicrobespt_PT
dc.subjectbacteriapt_PT
dc.subjectmicrobial cooperationpt_PT
dc.subjectevolutionpt_PT
dc.titleMaintenance of microbial cooperation mediated by public goods in single and multiple traits scenariospt_PT
dc.typearticlept_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionpt_PT
degois.publication.firstPage1pt_PT
degois.publication.lastPage47pt_PT
degois.publication.titleJournal of Bacteriologypt_PT
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://jb.asm.org/content/early/2017/08/22/JB.00297-17.abstractpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.date.embargo2018-09-
dc.identifier.doi10.1128/JB.00297-17pt_PT
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