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Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation

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dc.contributor.authorDionisio, F.
dc.contributor.authorGordo, I.
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-25T13:08:58Z
dc.date.available2010-03-25T13:08:58Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractBackground: A tragedy of the commons arises if individuals cannot protect their future use of a depletable resource, and individual fitness increases if individuals exploit the resource at rates beyond sustainability. Natural selection then forces the individuals to diminish, perhaps even to destroy, their resource. One way to protect future use is privatization - that is, locally excluding rivals from the resource. Another is to reduce rivalry among individuals by restricting exploitation rates.pt
dc.identifier.citationDionisio, F. and I. Gordo (2007) Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary Ecology Research 9(2): 365-373pt
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/85
dc.language.isoengpt
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.evolutionary-ecology.com/abstracts/v09/2106.htmlpt_PT
dc.subjectEvolution of complexitypt
dc.subjectExcludabilitypt
dc.subjectMulti-level selectionpt
dc.subjectPrivatizationpt
dc.subjectRivalrypt
dc.subjectTragedy of the commonspt
dc.subjectKin selection modelpt
dc.subjectCollective actionpt
dc.subjectMultilevel selectionpt
dc.subjectSocial evolutionpt
dc.subjectCommonspt
dc.subjectTragedypt
dc.subjectTransitionspt
dc.subjectCompetitionpt
dc.subjectRepressionpt
dc.titleControlling excludability in the evolution of cooperationpt
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage373pt
oaire.citation.startPage365pt
oaire.citation.titleEvolutionary Ecology Researchpt
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt
rcaap.typearticlept

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